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The article addresses the popular reading of Ingarden that his aesthetic theory is determined by on-
tology. This reading seems to suggest that, firstly, aesthetics lacks its autonomy, and, secondly, the 
subject of aesthetic experience is reproductive, and passive. The author focuses on Ingarden’s aesthetics 
formulated by him in the period of 1925–1944. Moreover, the study presents selected elements of Ing-
arden’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience, and by doing so, the author aims at showing how Ing-
arden’s aesthetics was reconsidered by Blaustein, a student of Ingarden, whose theory seems to lead one 
beyond the scope of ontology. Blaustein, namely, reconsiders Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional 
objects by interpreting it in a descriptive-psychological, or phenomenological fashion. The article is di-
vided into four parts. In section 1, the author highlights historical interconnections between Ingarden, 
and Blaustein. Section 2.1. is devoted to Ingarden’s phenomenological approach towards aesthetic ex-
perience as a phasic structure. At this basis, in section 2.2., Ingarden’s early theory of intentional objects 
is to be discussed. Section 3 concerns Blaustein’s contribution to phenomenology of aesthetic experi-
ence. Given that Blaustein formulates his theory in discussion with Ingarden, section 3.1. is devoted 
to Blaustein’s critical assessment of Ingarden’s method, and aesthetics. Next, in section 3.2., the author 
presents Blaustein’s original theory of presentations, and its use in aesthetics. Finally, in section 4, the 
author lists similarities, and differences between Blaustein’s and Ingarden’s aesthetic theories.
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В статье рассматривается распространённое прочтение Ингардена, согласно которому его эсте-
тическая теория обусловлена онтологией. В  таком прочтении, во-первых, предполагается, что 
эстетика лишена автономии, и, во-вторых, что субъект эстетического опыта воспроизводим 
и пассивен. Автор статьи сосредотачивается на эстетике Ингардена, сформулированной им меж-
ду 1925 и 1944 гг. Кроме того, в статье представлены отдельные элементы феноменологии эстети-
ческого опыта Ингардена, с помощью которых автор стремится продемонстрировать пересмотр 
эстетики Ингардена его студентом Блауштайном: теория последнего выходит за рамки онтологии. 
В частности, Блауштайн переосмысляет теорию Ингардена о чисто интенциональных объектах, 
интерпретируя её дескриптивно-психологическим, или феноменологическим, образом. Статья 
разделена на четыре части. В разделе 1 автор намечает исторические параллели между Ингарде-
ном и Блауштайном. Раздел 2.1. посвящён феноменологическому подходу Ингардена к эстетиче-
скому опыту как многофазовой структуре. Исходя из этого, в разделе 2.2. следует остановиться 
на ранней теории интенциональных предметов Ингардена. Раздел 3 будет посвящён вкладу Бла-
уштайна в феноменологию эстетического опыта. Учитывая тот факт, что Блауштайн формулиру-
ет собственную теорию в полемике с Ингарденом, в разделе 3.1. будет рассмотрена критическая 
оценка Блауштайном метода и эстетики Ингардена. Далее, в разделе 3.2., представлена исходная 
теория представлений Блауштайна и её применение в эстетике. Наконец, в разделе 4 автор пере-
числяет сходства и различия между эстетическими теориями Блауштайна и Ингардена.
Ключевые слова: эстетический опыт, дескриптивная психология, чисто интенциональный пред-
мет, теория представлений, Ингарден, Блауштайн.
1. INTRODUCTION
According to a popular reading of Roman Ingarden’s (1893–1970) aesthetics1, 
which is maintained—to some extent—by the philosopher himself2, his aesthetic the-
ory is determined by ontology. In line with this reading, Ingarden mainly emphasizes 
1 “The Controversy dominates Ingarden’s philosophic work also in the sense that a large part of his achieve-
ments in the theory of art, and indirectly in aesthetics, axiology of man, philosophy of language, and logic 
arose on the basis of its ontological problematic” (Gierulanka, 1989, 12). See also (Casey, 1973, xx). For 
recent presentations and discussions, see (Sepp, 2005, 392; Bundgaard, 2013; Bortolussi & Dixon, 2015). 
2 In the “Preface to the first German edition” to Das literarische Kunstwerk, Ingarden declares: “Al-
though the main subject of my investigations in the literary work, of the literary work of art, the 
ultimate motives for my work on this subject are of a general philosophical nature, and they far 
transcend this particular subject. They are closely connected to the problem of idealism-realism, 
with which I have been concerning myself for many years” (Ingarden, 1973b, lxxii). 
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the questions of the aesthetic object, its structure, ontological properties, and its rela-
tion to other objects, e.g., to the work of art. This, however, has a far reaching conse-
quence: The first-personal aspect of aesthetic experience seems to be completely for-
gotten here. In other words, one can have an impression that Ingarden did not develop 
a phenomenology of aesthetic experience at all. Yet, this is false3. In the present article 
I challenge this ontological reading, and one of my tasks here is to discuss Ingarden’s 
phenomenology of aesthetic experience. Secondly, I want to ask about the develop-
ment of Ingarden’s account in the writings of his student, and later a critic, Leopold 
Blaustein (1905–1942 [or 1944]). My ultimate aim is a juxtaposition of both philos-
ophers to show in what respect Blaustein’s reconsideration of Ingarden’s aesthetics goes 
beyond his position. Of course, Ingarden in his considerations refer to both ontology 
and phenomenology, and, as I will argue, whereas Blaustein accepts some phenome-
nological observations of Ingarden, he rephrase, or even reject his ontological theses. 
Before summarizing the argument of the study, let me begin with a few histor-
ical remarks. Ingarden starts his studies in Lvov in 1911, but after a year he moves 
to Germany, first to Göttingen, later to Freiburg im Breisgau, and he completes his 
doctoral dissertation on Bergson in 1918  under Edmund Husserl (1859–1938). In 
1918–1925  he works as a high school teacher in Lublin, Warsaw, and Toruń. This 
period ends with a publication of his Habilitationsschrift (Ingarden, 1925). The book 
enables him to get a job as a Dozent at the Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov. There 
in 1927 he starts lecturing on the literary work of art, and in 1931 he publishes his 
main work on aesthetics — Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem 
Grenzgebiet den Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft (Ingarden, 1973b)—which 
summarizes these lectures. After this he attempts to become a Professor at the univer-
sity (see, e.g., Ingarden, 1999), and he get a chair in 1933. In 1934–1939 he teaches 
seminars on aesthetics. Precisely at these seminar meetings, Ingarden develops his 
phenomenology of aesthetic experience, summarized in § 24 of O poznawaniu działa 
literackiego [The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art] (Ingarden, 1973a), published 
in Polish originally in 1937. Ingarden moves from Lvov to Krakow in 1944, and after 
World War II he develops his aesthetics by introducing, e.g., the idea of an encoun-
ter with the artwork, or the concept of a situation to describe aesthetic experience 
as a whole (e.g., Ingarden, 1975; Stróżewski, 1972). During the Lvov period (1925–
1944) Ingarden meets a twelve years younger, talented student—Blaustein, who stud-
ies in Lvov probably in 1923–1927. In the summer semester 1925  Blaustein leaves 
Poland to study in Freiburg im Breisgau under Husserl. After his return to Lvov, he 
3 See, e.g., (Stróżewski, 1972; Küng, 1975; Takei, 1984; Mitscherling, 1997; Kocay, 2002). 
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writes—under Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938)—a doctoral dissertation on Hus-
serl’s theory of act and content4. Blaustein comprehends his book as an introductory 
research to his original research on aesthetic experience as a combination of so-called 
imaginative presentations. In the 1930’s, he investigates not only the theoretical basis 
for aesthetics, but he uses also phenomenology to analyze concrete aesthetic phenom-
ena, for instance, listening to the radio, watching a movie in the cinema, or a stage 
play in a theater5. Blaustein’s major work on aesthetics is completed just before World 
War II in 1939—Die ästhetische Perzeption. Unfortunately, the book manuscript is 
lost during the war, and Blaustein himself dies with his family in the Jewish ghetto in 
Lvov. Blaustein — together with Ingarden—is recognized as a member of the Polish 
phenomenological school in aesthetics (cf. Pazura, 1966, 90; Ptaszek, 2011, 120). 
Both biographical sketches show that Ingarden, and Blaustein share similar re-
search interests in aesthetics. Yet, the whole picture is quite complex. There are, of 
course, mutual interconnections, or even continuations between both thinkers. After 
all, Blaustein participates in Ingarden’s lectures on aesthetics as early as 1927. In his 
memories on Blaustein, Ingarden (1963, 87) notices that in the Lvov period he met 
Blaustein “almost every day,” and they discussed on aesthetics widely. It is not surpris-
ing, then, that in one of his later letters, Ingarden (1959) calls Blaustein “my student” 
[mój uczeń], which suggests that he comprehends Blaustein as a continuator of his 
own phenomenological project. This is evident if one refers the “Foreword to the Pol-
ish Edition” of Das literarische Kunstwerk, where Ingarden (1960, 15) acknowledges, 
and appreciates Blaustein’s attempts to develop the research project presented in this 
book also beyond the limits of the philosophy of literature, e.g., to study a radio expe-
rience. Indeed, in three reviews of the German edition of Das literarische Kunstwerk, 
Blaustein (1930a; 1932; 1935–1937) postulates to extend the thematic scope of the 
research program formulated in this book. So, following Dziemidok (1980, 178), it 
is justified to claim that “Blaustein’s views on many basic issues of aesthetics were in-
spired by Ingarden”6. Nonetheless, Dziemidok’s thesis should be read in an adequate 
context. My point is that the Ingarden-Blaustein discussion is marked also by criti-
cal reconsiderations, and reexaminations, or even breaks. Even if Blaustein accepts, 
and uses the theory of purely intentional objects, he criticizes Ingarden’s method: in 
contrast to Ingarden’s ontological phenomenology, he offered to understand phe-
nomenology as descriptive psychology which concerns types of concrete experiences, 
4 On Blaustein’s position in the school of early phenomenology in Poland, see (Płotka, 2017).
5 More on Blaustein’s philosophy, also in the context of aesthetics, see (Dziemidok, 1980; Miskiewicz, 
2009; Rosińska, 2013; Płotka, 2020c). 
6 See also (Ptaszek, 2011, 120).
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rather than—as Ingarden would insist—ideas of experiences. In response, Ingarden 
(1960, 15) accuses Blaustein of falling into psychologism by reducing the object of 
consciousness to a mere mental image. If Ingarden is right, Blaustein in fact misreads 
his aesthetics. All in all, the systematization of the Ingarden-Blaustein discussion is 
necessary. Remarkably, the discussion is explored (to some extent) only by Dziemidok 
(1980). In this study, I attempt to fulfill this striking lack in the scholarship on early 
phenomenology.
The article is divided into two main parts: section 2 is devoted to Ingarden and 
section 3 to Blaustein. In section 2.1. I present Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthet-
ic experience as a phasic structure, divided into three parts: a passive preliminary 
emotion, concretization, and an emotional response to the aesthetic value. The first 
phase is described as a transition of the practical attitude to the aesthetic one. I de-
scribe this transition as distancing from the world. The second phase is grasped as 
a result of the preliminary experience, and it consists in a fulfillment of the spots of 
indeterminacy. The last phase consists in responding to aesthetic values which are 
constituted in a “polyphonic harmony” of Gestalt qualities. Next, in the section 2.2., 
I examine Ingarden’s theory of purely intentional objects as heteronymous in relation 
to the act. Here, I will sketch out a difference between purely intentional and also 
intentional objects. This will enable me to reconstruct the structure of aesthetic expe-
rience according to Ingarden. Section 3.1. is mostly polemical. It presents Blaustein’s 
critical assessment of Ingarden’s method and his aesthetics. Blaustein’s main goal is to 
reinterpret eidetic phenomenology of Ingarden in a Brentanian fashion as descrip-
tive-psychological discipline. I will argue that this shift in methodology has far reach-
ing consequences in Blaustein’s view of Ingarden’s aesthetics. I attempt at describing 
these consequences in section 3.2. where I will present Blaustein’s theory of presenta-
tions. I analyze Blaustein’s understanding of a psychological representation, different 
relations between the presenting content, and the object, and, finally, his theory of in-
tuitive, and non-intuitive presentations. Next, I use all these descriptive distinctions to 
reconstruct Blaustein’s view of aesthetic experience, wherein I focus on two examples: 
perceiving a painting, and watching a theater play. In concluding remarks (section 4), 
I will list main similarities, and differences between Ingarden, and Blaustein. Let me 
add that in the present juxtaposition of both thinkers, I do not claim to present their 
theories in length; this would require a separate study. I focus instead on selected el-
ements which bind, or differ both approaches. In this examination, I aim at showing 
how, if at all, Blaustein’s contribution to aesthetics situate him outside Ingarden’s on-
tology, or, speaking metaphorically, how he leads us beyond ontology.
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2. EARLY AESTHETICS OF INGARDEN:  
BETWEEN ONTOLOGY AND PHENOMENOLOGY
Ingarden’s aesthetics, as Gniazdowski (2010, 167) rightly states, is divided into 
three complementary parts which mirror a general structure of experience as such. 
So, (1) experience has its subjective, i.e., first-personal character. In classical terms, 
experience gives us an object in different ways, or—to employ Husserl’s term—in dif-
ferent modi. One can, for instance, judge about something, think of it, or want it. So, 
different acts correspond with different ways of experiencing the object. In aesthetics 
this means that while perceiving, say, a work of art, one perceives it in a specific way. 
Here Ingarden uses phenomenology, which enables him to explore these ways, or modi 
of experience (cf. Ingarden, 1961; 1973a). Next, (2) given that every experience is in-
tentional, i.e., it has its object, aesthetic experience is also directed towards its specific 
object. In general terms, for Ingarden, ontology is an a priori discipline, which ena-
bles one to describe possible modes, forms, and materials of every (non-contradict) 
whatsoever (cf. Mitscherling, 1997, 79–121). Ontology thus defined explores topics 
connected to every existing object, despite whether it actually, factually, or ideally 
exists. Briefly speaking, ontology is a general theory of an object. Accordingly, In-
garden’s aesthetics adopts an ontological framework and consequently it develops an 
ontology of the work of art. Here, as we will see below, Ingarden sketches a difference 
between the work of art and the aesthetic object, and he investigates their structures 
and interrelations. Finally, (3) while experiencing something, one constitutes values, 
say, a value of truth while judging that “I am reading a paper right now”. Therefore, 
axiology is necessary to examine this aspect of experience and it is of crucial impor-
tance for aesthetics. After all, aesthetic experience has an axiological aspect, since 
the object presents itself as aesthetically valuable; Ingarden (1961, 311)7 holds that 
the ultimate aim of aesthetic experience is to “realize” aesthetic values. In a word, 
the third part of Ingarden’s aesthetics is his axiology understood as the theory of aes-
thetic values. Since Blaustein refers in his aesthetics mainly to Ingarden’s ontology 
and phenomenology, I will limit my exposition in this part of the article to these two 
subdisciplines of Ingarden’s philosophy. In section 2.1., I will present components of 
Ingarden’s early phenomenology of aesthetic experience. At this basis, in section 2.2., 
I attempt a reconstruction of his contribution to aesthetic ontology in the theory of 
purely intentional objects.
7 See also Gniazdowski (2010, 168).
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2.1. Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience in the 1930’s
Ingarden formulates his phenomenology of aesthetic experience in the context 
of the following question: How does one get knowledge of the literary work of art 
while reading, say, a novel8? As we will see, for Ingarden, the cognition of the work 
of art, and thus cognitive acts9, are different than the contemplation of the work, and 
thus aesthetic acts, or experience10. To examine the difference, in § 24 of O poznawa-
niu działa literackiego [The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art], Ingarden (1973a, 
175–218; see also 1961) describes the structure, and character of aesthetic experience. 
The important point is that aesthetic experience is not limited to the contemplation of 
artistic objects, but can also refer to non-artistic objects, e.g., a landscape. This form of 
experience has a specific function: it constitutes (or creates) its unique object, namely 
the aesthetic object as a whole, which, in turn, is irreducible neither to the work of art, 
nor to the real object. This means that aesthetic experience can (yet does not have to) 
begin with the perception of a real object, but it can also concern also a fictional, i.e., 
non-real object (Ingarden, 1961, 290; 1973a, 178–179)11. 
Next, aesthetic experience is understood by Ingarden as temporal. This means 
that it is neither momentary, nor reducible to a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. 
In turn, as Ingarden (1961, 295; 1973a, 187) puts it, aesthetic experience has phasic 
structure, and as such it is divided into three main phases: (1) its beginning is mainly 
passive, and it consists in a preliminary emotion. This moment is described by In-
garden as a transition of attitudes: from the practical one to the aesthetic one, and it 
is understood as a distancing from the world. Next, (2) the result of the preliminary 
experience is concretization of the aesthetic object by fulfillment of the spots of in-
determinacy. Finally, (3) an experience of the value of the object is constituted as an 
emotional response to the value. This, in turn, can led—yet, it does not have to lead—
to the formulation of the aesthetic judgment and conceptual expression. 
8 For a more straightforward phenomenological analysis of the experience of reading, mainly in Hus-
serl, see (Byrne 2017a; 2017b).
9 By “cognitive acts” Ingarden understands in this very context such acts as, e.g., knowing the story 
presented in a novel, noticing the structure of the text, identifying rhetorical devices used by the 
author of the text, etc.
10 It is worth to note, however, that cognitive acts can (yet do not have to) be founded on the basis of 
aesthetic experience. For Ingarden, cognitive experience can be both heteronymous, and autono-
mous in relation to aesthetic experience. 
11 On Ingarden’s understanding of the fictional objects, also in comparison to Husserl, see (Płotka, 
2020a). 
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In regard to (1), Ingarden (1961, 296; 1973a, 188) claims that the phase is “passive” 
and “fleeting” since one is “struck” with a peculiar quality or with a multiplicity of qualities 
which focus his or her attention, and which are not indifferent to him or her. In sum, one 
is “excited” about the quality or qualities. This preliminary emotion founds the change of 
a man’s attitude. Ingarden identifies further subphases of the preliminary emotion: 
a) an emotional, and as yet still in germ, direct intercourse with the quality experienced, 
b) a sort of desire to possess this quality and to augment the delight promised by an 
intuitive possession of it, c) a tendency to satiate oneself with the quality in question, to 
consolidate the possession of it. (Ingarden, 1961, 296; cf. 1973a, 190)
The preliminary emotion breaks the familiarity of the world, or rather it breaks 
man’s natural, i.e., practical life. For Ingarden, then, aesthetic experience interrupts the 
flow of daily life, and it situates the subject outside his or her practical interests. The shift 
of attitudes from the practical to the aesthetic consists in a shift from man’s focus on 
the fact of real existence of a particular quality to the qualities themselves. A conviction 
about the real existence of the world is neutralized, which Ingarden (1961, 300; 1973a, 
195–196) describes as the phenomenon of “forgetting the world.” This, however, as we 
will see below in section 3.3., situates Ingarden’s position close to Blaustein for whom 
aesthetic contemplation also situates us outside the world of praxis. 
Ingarden opposes the preliminary emotion with (2). Properly speaking, in this 
phase the preliminary emotion is passing and the aesthetic object is created. For this 
reason, in contrast to the preliminary emotion, which was passive, the present phase 
of experience is strictly active, though it does not introduce visible changes in the real 
world. According to Ingarden (1961, 302; 1973a, 197), whereas the preliminary emo-
tion opens one to experience the aesthetic quality, this emotion is still “initial,” and 
it invites one to improve the quality. Therefore, while experiencing the work of art, 
one seeks new aesthetic qualities, which can found further elements of the aesthetic 
object. The ultimate aim of this phase is to create the aesthetic object formed in a 
unity of qualities, which are harmonized in the object. Strictly speaking, the aesthetic 
object is a new, yet heteronymous, object which, in turn, is understood by Ingarden as 
the subject of properties, i.e., aesthetic qualities12. The process of concretization, thus 
described, is an active element of aesthetic experience. Curiously enough, this active 
12 “The new subject should be chosen in such a way that it could be a substratum just of the qualities 
given; or, in other words: this substratum is determined in its qualitative equipment by the choice of 
the qualities grasped as well as by the relations between them. As this new subject of properties—hav-
ing been posed by us—begins, in turn, to appear itself in concrete qualities given in an evident way, 
it assumes that character of a separate entity, which becomes present to us” (Ingarden, 1961, 304).
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concretization of the object also indicates an intersubjective level of experience sine 
it establishes, as Ingarden (1961, 305; 1973a, 203) puts it, “emotional community of 
experience.” The community enables an emotional response to the formed aesthetic 
object. To be precise, Ingarden holds that the emotion responses to “the structure of 
the qualitative harmony in the content of aesthetic object.” This means that the expe-
rienced object presents itself in certain Gestalt qualities. If this is indeed the case, the 
phase (2) corresponds with some aspects of Blaustein’s view of aesthetic experience, 
which, according to his theory of imaginative presentations, is directed toward Gestalt 
qualities, and moreover is intersubjective through and through.
Aesthetic experience, as described by Ingarden, culminates in (3). This phase 
consists in an “appeasement” of emotions which are finally formed as an emotional 
response to a harmony of qualities (Ingarden, 1961, 307–308; 1973a, 207). Here one 
can once again change their attitude to the investigating-cognitive one and, as a result, 
one is able to evaluate the aesthetic object by judging it as aesthetically beautiful or 
as ugly. Whereas the former evaluation arises in a positive response to the value, the 
latter is founded on a negative response. In both cases, however, the experience makes 
this judgement valid. This phase can end with cognitive act, yet this is not a necessary 
condition to experience the object. Nonetheless, Ingarden (1973a, 173–174) clearly 
emphasizes that this cognitive act is not aesthetic experience.
To sum up this part of the article, aesthetic experience is for Ingarden a complex 
phenomenon, which has a phasic structure. It involves emotional, active (i.e., crea-
tive), and passive elements, which all can culminate in a cognitive act. According to 
Ingarden, the aesthetic experience is active, or, as he puts it, full of dynamism. Given 
this, we can conclude, first, that aesthetic experience is not strictly determined by the 
ontological structure of the artwork, as Rybicki (1975, 95), Dziemidok (1980, 93, 106) 
claim. After all, the new, aesthetic object is created. Second and more importantly, 
Ingarden rejects the primacy of signification (or the primacy of cognition) in expe-
riencing the object, but — as presented above — the experience is first and foremost 
emotional. Significations play a role after aesthetic experience if one changes the aes-
thetic attitude for the cognitive one. 
2.2. The object of aesthetic experience:  
a sketch of the theory of intentional objects
As claimed in section 1, Ingarden’s aesthetic theory seems to be determined 
by ontology. Indeed, in the “Preface to the first German edition” to Das literarische 
Kunstwerk, Ingarden declares: 
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Although the main subject of my investigations in the literary work, of the literary work 
of art, the ultimate motives for my work on this subject are of a general philosophical 
nature, and they far transcend this particular subject. They are closely connected to the 
problem of idealism-realism, with which I have been concerning myself for many years. 
(Ingarden, 1973b, lxxii)
It is true that Ingarden “closely” connects aesthetical investigations with the 
problem of idealism-realism, yet it is too hasty to accept the thesis that the author 
of Das literarische Kunstwerk devaluates aesthetics in favor of ontology. Ingarden’s 
(1973b, 9–12) intention is to show that the question of the literary work of art requires 
one to ask the question of: How does the work of art exist? In short, aesthetics requires 
ontology, this, however, does not mean that ontology determines aesthetics. Ontology 
rather provides the conceptual tools to analyze different types of art. This is precisely 
the case of Das literarische Kunstwerk. While analyzing the content of the idea of the 
literary work of art, Ingarden (1973b, 30) identifies the work as many-layered object 
which is divided into four layers: (1) word sounds, (2) meaning unities, (3) schema-
tized aspects, and (4)  the stratum of represented objects. Every stratum exists in a 
specific way, and ontology enables one to describe these ways adequately. Ingarden’s 
key insight into the idea of the literary work of art in particular, and into aesthetics 
in general, is his theory of purely intentional objects; the theory describes the way of 
existence of different layers. In § 20 of Das literarische Kunstwerk, he writes: 
By a purely intentional objectivity we understand an objectivity that is in a figurative 
sense “created” by an act of consciousness or by a manifold of acts or, finally, by a forma-
tion (e.g., a word meaning, a sentence) exclusively on the basis of an immanent, original, 
or only conferred intentionality and has, in the given objectivities, the source of its exist-
ence and its total essence. (Ingarden, 1973b, 117)
A purely intentional object, then, is an object, which does not build a whole 
with the act in which it is “created.” It is dependent in its existence on the act, but it is 
not a part of the act since this would lead us back towards psychologism. Therefore, 
“creation” does not meant that one produces an object which exists independently of 
the act, i.e., it cannot be “created” outside the act; the object is rather heteronymous, 
and exists only as an object of the act, but not as its part. For instance, if one imagines 
a Pegasus, this object exists purely intentional, meaning it has “the source of its exist-
ence” in the act of imagining; moreover, the imagined Pegasus has features ascribed 
only in this act, e.g., having wings as an eagle, etc., but the object is not a psychic part 
of the act. Rather it is transcendent as purely intentional (not psychic) entity. This gen-
eral theory is useful for understanding the existence of different strata of the literary 
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work of art: while reading a book, one images characters presented in the novel, how-
ever, their existence is purely intentional. More importantly, the theory can be also 
used in aesthetics: while contemplating, for instance, a painting one constitutes the 
work of art in a purely intentional fashion, and on this basis, one can also constitute an 
aesthetic object, i.e., the object of aesthetic contemplation. So, according to Ingarden, 
an aesthetic object is non-identical to any real object, say a painting, sculpture, or the 
literary work of art. One can destroy, for instance, canvas, but the aesthetic object is 
different than a material thing. Following Ingarden, the aesthetic object is formed by 
successive encounters with the art object in a process, which he calls, a concretiza-
tion13. This process involves the formation of an aesthetic object, which finally be-
comes the purely intentional object. To understand the way of existence of the object, 
let me refer to some elements of Ingarden’s early ontology.
In Ingarden’s (1929, 165–168; cf. 2013, 109–155; 2016, 171–219) ontology, 
which was formulated as early as the 1920’s, i.e., before publishing Das literarische 
Kunstwerk, one finds a precise description of four basic existential-ontological rela-
tions: (1) autonomy, and heteronomy, (2) originality, and derivativeness, (3) self-suffi-
ciency and non-self-sufficiency (or separability, and inseparability), finally, (4) depend-
ence, and independence14. Given this, a purely intentional object is (1) heteronymous, 
(2) derivative, (3) self-sufficient, and (4) dependent. Ingarden uses this description in 
the context of the work of art, and the aesthetic object respectively. The work of art is 
constituted purely intentionally in an act that “creates” an object with certain prop-
erties, e.g., a painting with a property of presenting a landscape, or being a portrait. 
This object is heteronymous, because it is constituted by the act of apprehension which 
apprehend, say, colors on canvas as a representation of the landscape15; derivative, be-
cause it is produced by the act of apprehension, or as a result of the act of concretiza-
13 On the concept of concretization, see (Takei, 1984; Szczepańska, 1989, 32–38).
14 According to Ingarden, to describe the object as (1) existentially autonomous means that it has its 
existential foundation in itself, while it is existentially heteronomous if it has its foundation outside 
of itself; (2) the object is existentially original if it is not “produced” by any other object; in turn, the 
object is derivative if it is produced by any other entity; (3) the object is existentially self-sufficient if 
it requires for its being the being of no other entity which would have to coexist with it, while it is 
existentially non-self-sufficient if this is not the case; finally, (4) the object is existentially dependent 
if it is possible for an entity to be self-sufficient and still require the existence of some other self-suf-
ficient entity; in turn, the object is existentially self-dependent if is it is self-sufficient and moreover 
it does not require any other entity for its existence. Cf. (Mitscherling, 1997, 90–99; Simons, 2005; 
Piwowarczyk, 2020).
15 The object is heteronymous also in the sense that it has features ascribed by the act. E. g., if one ima-
gines a Pegasus with white wings, the color is ascribed within the act of imagining. In other words, 
the object does not have features on its own. 
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tion; self-sufficient, because it does not build a whole with the act, so it is a transcend-
ent, non-psychic, yet purely intentional entity, and as such it is separable from the act; 
finally, dependent, because it requires the existence of a certain act, for instance, the 
act of concretization. To be clear, although the object is heteronomous and derivative 
it is not reducible to mental experiences; just the opposite, it is transcendent through 
and through (Ingarden, 1973a, 14). Furthermore, if one contemplates the work of art 
(or different non-artistic object), one can constitute the aesthetic object which — ac-
cording to the description presented in the section 2.1.—is a purely intentional object 
which has ascribed properties as qualitative equipment, i.e., the qualitative harmony in 
the content of aesthetic object. This object is heteronymous, because it exists only due 
to the act of aesthetic contemplation, and without this act, there is no aesthetic object 
at all; derivative, because it is created by the act of aesthetic contemplation; self-suffi-
cient, because it is a separable part of the entire act of the aesthetic contemplation, and 
it has features—the qualitative harmony—ascribed by the contemplating act; and fi-
nally dependent, because it requires for its existence the act of aesthetic contemplation. 
To be precise, Ingarden’s description concerns both the aesthetic object (the 
object with the ascribed qualitative harmony), and the work of art (the object with 
the ascribed artistic qualities), but his descriptions do not hold for the real object, e.g., 
canvas of the painting, or a marble in a sculpture. As claimed above, for Ingarden, 
the work of art, as well as the aesthetic object are non-identical to any material ob-
ject. The aesthetic object does not represent the material object, but rather is a new, 
constituted (or “created”) object (just as the art object is created by the artist). To 
understand this aspect of Ingarden’s aesthetics, let me refer to his analysis formulated 
in Vom formalen Aufbau des individuellen Gegenstandes, originally published in 1935. 
Ingarden’s (1935, 33) theory of the individual object refers to Aristotle’s hypokeime-
non (ὑποκείμενον), i.e., the object as the subject of properties. Although properties 
of the object are non-self-sufficient, or inseparable from the object, the object is a 
whole that is self-sufficient. As Ingarden (1935, 68) states, “the subject of properties 
and the endless multiplicity of properties as properties are essentially connected.” The 
individual object (1) is determined in all its properties, and as such is self-sufficient; 
next (2) it is a unity, i.e., a whole that cannot be divided; (3) if the individual object 
is divided it is destroyed, so it stops to exist; (4) two individual subjects cannot have 
the same property; (5) yet the individuality of the object is undefined as such since 
it is a specific moment of the way of existence; finally, (6) if the object is individual, 
everything that can be pointed out in it is also individual, including properties (In-
garden, 1935, 79–80). To adapt this ontological theory to aesthetics, it is instructive to 
comprehend the work of art and the aesthetic object as ontologically founded on the 
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individual object, e.g., a book. Nonetheless, the above mentioned layers have different 
formal-ontological structure: they are not autonomous. They are rather schematic, or 
intentional layers and as such they are constituted in corresponding acts, but, at the 
same time, they are co-constituted by the individual and autonomous object. The ma-
terial thing, say a book, a brick of marble, then, is autonomous, but both the artwork, 
and the aesthetic object are—heteronomous. As claimed, the formal structure of the 
real object (say, canvas) is different than that of the aesthetic object (or the artwork): 
whereas the former, as the individual object, is determined in all its properties, the lat-
ter contains so-called “spots of indeterminacy” (Ingarden, 1973b, 246–254). As early 
as 1925, Ingarden (1925, 276) refers to the idea that some objects are to be understood 
as a sketch (Skizze), and as such they cannot be determined in all properties. The spots 
of indeterminacy as defined in Das literarische Kunstwerk mirror this early concept. 
They are understood as gaps in a content that cannot be fulfilled by further acts16. In 
this context, aesthetic experience can be described as an attempt at fulfilling the spots 
by its concretization, i.e., by the act of “creating” the new subject, which would be the 
subject of aesthetic properties, including qualitative harmony of aesthetically valuable 
properties. But if this is indeed the case, concretization—contra Rybicki (1975, 95), 
and Dziemidok (1980, 93, 106)—is a strictly active aspect of experience since it “cre-
ates” a new object. However, “spots of indeterminacy” form the content of the purely 
intentional object, so, as Ingarden (1973b, 371) puts it, the work of art also “works on 
us,” namely it begins the process of constitution, or “creation” of the new, i.e., aesthetic 
object.
Concluding this part of the article, let me indicate that for Ingarden the real in-
dividual object exists autonomously, and as such it can be an “also intentional” object 
which is the basis for a constitution of the purely intentional, i.e., heteronomous object, 
the work of art, or the aesthetic object. Ingarden’s thesis that the aesthetic object can 
be the object of derivative intentionality means here that it is not founded exclusively 
on mental (or intentional) acts, but also on the individual, i.e., autonomous object: the 
real object. This is evident in Ingarden’s (1973b, 317–323) short analysis of the stage 
play: people on the stage are individual, and autonomous objects; Ingarden calls them 
16 The object is schematic, following Ingarden, in the sense that it is not determined in its properties, 
so it has spots of indeterminacy. Ingarden introduces these ideas while differing the real, and purely 
intentional object. He writes: “every real object is unequivocally, universally (i.e., in every respect) 
determined. Unequivocal, universal determination means that in its total essence [Sosein] a real 
object cannot have any spots where in itself it would not be totally determined, i.e., either by A or 
by non-A, an indeed where it would not be so determined that as long as A was its determination 
in a given respect, it could not, at the same time, in the same respect, be non-A. To put it briefly: its 
essence does not show any spots of indeterminacy” (Ingarden, 1973b, 246).
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“representing objects,” which “represent” purely intentional objects, i.e., the “repre-
sented objects,” whereas the performance is a certain concretization. Here people on 
the stage are ultimately determined in their properties since they are autonomous and 
individual objects. Moreover, they are also intentional objects, but the objects they 
represent—the “represented objects”—are purely intentional, and as such—schematic. 
This ontological description of the stage play formulated by Ingarden would be sup-
plemented by Blaustein with an descriptive-psychological analysis.
3. BLAUSTEIN ON AESTHTIC EXPERIENCE AND  
ITS STRUCTURE
Blaustein has an opportunity to study Ingarden’s aesthetics since 1927 when the 
latter holds lectures on the theory presented later (in 1931) in length in Das literarische 
Kunstwerk. Moreover, in 1930  and in 1931  Blaustein publishes two short books in 
Polish on Przedstawiania imaginatywne. Studyum z pogranicza psychologii i estetyki 
[Imaginative Presentations. A Study in the Borderland Between Psychology and Aesthet-
ics], and on Przedstawienia schematyczne i symboliczne. Badania z pogranicza psycho-
logii i estetyki [Schematic and Symbolic Presentations. A Survey from the Borderland of 
Psychology and Aesthetics], which both adopt and develop some of Ingarden’s ideas17. 
In his books, Blaustein engages not only with Ingarden, but also with, amongst others, 
Husserl, Brentano, Twardowski, Alexius Meinong (1853–1920), and Stephan Witasek 
(1870–1915). During the 1930’s, Blaustein closely works together with Ingarden. He 
participates in Ingarden’s aesthetic seminars, where ideas later (in 1937) presented 
in O poznawaniu działa literackiego [The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art] are 
discussed. First and foremost, however, Blaustein establishes a permanent dialogue 
with his Lvov teacher (Ingarden, 1963, 87). At the basis of this cooperation, Blaustein 
(1937; 1938; 2005) formulates an original phenomenology of aesthetic experience. 
Given all these influences, and interconnections, the aim of this part of the article 
is to present, and to discuss Blaustein’s view of aesthetic experience. First, however, 
in section 3.1., I attempt to reconstruct his continuations, as well as his breaks with 
Ingarden’s heritage. Next, in section 3.2., I read his theory of presentations, and I re-
construct how Blaustein use that theory when developing his aesthetics. 
17 Ingarden notices this fact in a footnote to Das literarische Kunstwerk. See (Ingarden, 1973b, 319–
320, fn. 10).
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3.1. Blaustein’s critical analysis  
of Ingarden’s method and his aesthetics
It is hard to deny that Blaustein is influenced by Ingarden, first and foremost by 
his aesthetics, but also (to some extent) by ontology and epistemology. Nonetheless, 
his reading of Ingarden is critical because of methodological reasons. This, in turn, 
results in reinterpretation of some basic concepts of Ingarden. Of course, a recon-
struction of Blaustein’s critical evaluation of the method of phenomenology has to 
be understood from within the entire context of methodological disputes in Lvov, 
especially with regards to phenomenology in relation to descriptive psychology (cf. 
Płotka, 2020b, esp. 19–23). This, however, goes beyond my aims here. Let me empha-
size only the key insight of Blaustein. 
In two talks, given by him on the 28th of April and the 5th of May 1928, during the 
meetings of the Polish Philosophical Society, Blaustein questions the eidetic approach 
of phenomenology. Phenomenology is understood by him as “descriptive discipline 
which concerns ideal essences of lived experiences of pure consciousness” (Blaustein, 
1928–1929, 164b). In the first of these two talks, he formulates a series of arguments, 
which show that essences are in fact presupposed in their existence before one starts 
doing phenomenology. Phenomenology is interested in describing the general objects 
that exist, as Blaustein puts it (1928–1929, 166a), in “the world of ideas.” If so, howev-
er, one presupposes the ontological thesis about the existence of essences before she 
or he phenomenologically describes essences as such. In a word, phenomenology falls 
into the petitio principii error. Nonetheless, Blaustein’s reading is problematic. Already 
in his Logische Untersuchungen, Husserl presents the method of eidetic analysis in 
discussion with the modern theory of abstraction; precisely in this context, Husserl 
(1984, 127; 2001, 248; see also Hopkins, 1997) is clearly against a hypostatization of 
ideas as general objects. Surprisingly, then, Blaustein’s criticism misses the point. But, 
as Kuliniak & others (2016, 97, 114) suggest, Blaustein’s criticism is directed not to-
wards Husserl, but rather towards Ingarden. Indeed, it is Ingarden (1915, 306; 1919a; 
1919b; Szylewicz, 1993, 4) who popularizes the notion of phenomenology as a study 
of the content of ideas in the act of a direct seeing of essences (immanente Wesenser-
schauung). In his first presentations of phenomenology, one can find a quasi-Platonic 
understanding of essences as “ideal objects,” which do not exist in time or in the real 
space. As such, they are invariable (Ingarden, 1919b, 322). In contrast to Husserl, Ing-
arden (1919b, 324) claims that in the act of the direct apprehension of essences, there 
is also a moment of the affirmation of the ideal existence of the general objects. Such 
objects exist in the world of ideal objects. Even given the fact that Ingarden’s notion 
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of an idea is ambiguous (Chrudzimski, 1999, 25–29), it is striking that in his early 
writings in phenomenology, Ingarden, contra Husserl, adopts quasi-Platonic reading 
of essences. Precisely in this context, one has to understand Blaustein’s criticism of 
phenomenology.
But if phenomenology as an eidetic enterprise is impossible, how does Blaustein 
understand phenomenology at all? In contrast to Ingarden, he suggests that phenom-
enology should be developed in a Brentanian fashion, as suggested by Husserl (1984, 
24, fn. 1; 2001, 176–177) in the first edition of Untersuchungen, namely as descriptive 
psychology. In his opinion, instead of investigating ideal essences, the phenomeno-
logist should examine individual phenomena, and at this basis she or he should aim 
at types of these phenomena, where types are to be understood as the lowest species. 
Therefore, phenomenology is not an eidetic discipline which operates with a ques-
tionable—at least in Blaustein’s view—method of seeing essences, but rather it exam-
ines individual phenomena, and due to inductive generalizations, it enables one to 
achieve types of these phenomena. As Blaustein (1928–1929, 165b) puts it, “phenome-
nology is possible only as empirical and descriptive science of types (the lowest spe-
cies) of lived experiences of pure consciousness, [s]ince no direct investigation into 
higher species, unless it is held on the way of inductive generalization, is reliable.” For 
the Polish philosopher, then, Husserl’s eidetic intuition is replaced by the Brentanian 
introspection and retrospection. 
It is not surprising that this important shift in methodology has far reaching 
consequences for Blaustein’s philosophy in general, and for his aesthetics in particu-
lar. First, however, let me note consequences for his reading of Ingarden, which are 
clear while analyzing Blaustein’s (1930a; 1932; 1935–1937) three reviews of Ingarden’s 
Das literarische Kunstwerk. In general terms, Blaustein appreciates Ingarden’s detailed 
analysis of the literary work of art which, in his opinion, are one of the most valuable 
in philosophical literature of the time. More explicitly, he emphasizes the following 
five aspects of Ingarden’s theory: (1) his refutation of psychologism in literature which 
consists in reducing the literary work of art to the psychic life of a reader (Blaustein, 
1935–1937, 98b); (2) his theory of meaning according to which meaning is irreducible 
to the psyche or to ideal entities, and as such it is heteronomous in relation to the acts 
of understanding (Blaustein, 1930a, 454); (3) a clear differentiation between the act, 
contents, and the represented objects, which are key notions for understanding what 
the literary work of art is (Blaustein, 1932, 346); as a consequence of point 3, (4) his ac-
cent put on intentional objects which are schematic, and purely intentional (Blaustein, 
1932, 347); in this context, let me note that although Blaustein does not adopt Ing-
arden’s phrase, “purely intentional object,” he was aware that the theory of purely in-
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tentional objects—understood as quasi -real objects—corresponds with his original 
theory of imaginative objects (Blaustein, 1935–1937, 101b); finally, (5) his view of the 
literary work of art as a multi-strata object (Blaustein, 1935–1937, 99a). Despite these 
positive assessments, Blaustein formulated two charges against Ingarden’s aesthetics: 
(1) the issue of identity of the literary work of art is unclear, since different concret-
izations do not allow one to comprehend the work absolutely adequately (Blaustein, 
1932, 349); more importantly, (2) as a result of his criticism of the phenomenological 
method sketched above, one has to use “Ockham’s razor” on Ingarden’s contention 
that ideas are general objects and metaphysical entities (Blaustein, 1930a, 454; 1935–
1937, 101a); simply put, Blaustein rejects the ontological, and metaphysical context 
of Ingarden’s aesthetics. Instead he offers to develop a descriptive-psychological or 
phenomenological analysis of aesthetic experience, which leads him to his original 
theory of presentations.
3.2. On the variety of presentations in aesthetic experience
According to Blaustein’s (1928, 95) self-commentary, his aesthetics is closely 
connected to a criticism formulated in his doctoral dissertation on Husserl’s theory 
of act and content. Of course, a detailed reconstruction and a thorough discussion 
of this criticism is not my aim here (cf. Płotka, 2020c), however, let me note three 
important points. (1) Blaustein’s leading idea is to reinterpret Husserl’s lived-experi-
ences as sets or wholes of presentations, which apprehend sense-data. Consequent-
ly, lived experiences are, just as for Brentano (1995, 61), presentations or are based 
upon presentations (Blaustein, 1930b, 61; 1931b, 123). (2) Blaustein claims that pre-
sentations are different from sense-data in such a way that whereas presentations 
are lived through (durchlebt), sense-data are just experienced (erlebt). By claiming 
this, Blaustein is following Ingarden18. Given this differentiation, only sense-data are 
originally experienced; in turn, presentations apprehend them, and are founded on 
sense-data. (3) What follows, Blaustein is interested in lived experiences as such, and 
their character, rather than in their objects, and structures. What does this reading of 
Husserl mean for aesthetics? First of all, Blaustein (1937, 399; 1938a, 4; 2005, 4, 136) 
comprehends aesthetic experience as a complex act what means for him: as a whole 
18 As Ingarden emphasizes, „[j]edenfalls sind die Empfindungsdaten—und in noch höherem Maße 
die Ansichten verschiedener Stufen—Inhalte, die den Bewußtseinsakten auf bestimmte Weise 
gegenübertreten und selbst (in sich) nicht bewußt sind. D. h. ihre Seinweise ist die des Erlebtwerdens 
und nicht die des Durchlebens. Die Seinsweise des Erlebens der Empfindungsdaten dagegen ist die 
des ‘Durchlebens’“ (Ingarden, 1921, 562).
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which combines different presentations. In his analysis, Blaustein examines mainly 
visual artworks and for this reason, he claims that the basis of aesthetic experience 
is first and foremost perception, however, components of feelings, judgments, and 
volitional acts are also present. If sense-data found all experience, different presenta-
tions in aesthetic experience are defined by Blaustein in regard to the relation between 
presentational content and the object. A theoretical basis of Blaustein’s aesthetics is, 
then, an attempt at defining different types of presentations included in aesthetic ex-
perience. In turn, for Ingarden the aim of aesthetics is a description of the ontolog-
ical structure of the object constituted in such an experience. Let me look closer at 
Blaustein’s classification19.
To begin with, by “presentation” Blaustein (1930b, 13, fn. 1; 2005, 47, fn. 12) un-
derstands an “elementary intentional act sui generis.” As such it includes sensations 
(or sensational acts) or is founded upon sensations. However, this theory cannot be 
apprehend as a form of naïve sensualism since it also accepts immanent, or introspec-
tive sensations20. As such, following Blaustein (1931b, 99–100), presentations have the 
function of a psychological representation, which consists in someone’s presenting of 
the represented object via the presenting object. Therefore, the phrase “A represents 
[…] for X—B, if X presents […] him or herself B due to A” should be read—within 
Blaustein’s psychology—as “X presents him or herself B using A in such a way that A 
is given (mostly intuitively) to X […], and that X comprehends B through the pre-
senting content of A” (Blaustein, 1931b, 101–102). However, the relation between the 
presenting content, and the object can be defined at least at four levels as: (1) adequate 
(if every element of content has a corresponding element of the object, and every el-
ement of the object has a corresponding element of content), (2) quasi-adequate (if 
every element of content has a corresponding element of the object, but it refers to 
improper object of intention, rather than to the proper object), (3) inadequate (if at 
least some elements of content have some corresponding elements of the object), and 
(4) quasi-inadequate (if at least some elements of content have some corresponding 
elements of the object, but it refers to improper object of intention, rather than to the 
proper object) (Blaustein 1930b, 53–58). Blaustein uses here the notions of “proper” 
19 For the presentation of Blaustein’s theory of presentations in the context of cognitive acts, see Chudy 
(1981), and in the historical context of inquiries into the nature of intuition, and imagination, see 
Płotka (2019).
20 Rosińska (2013, 77) writes: “Sensations are the most elementary perceptual processes in which sen-
sual data is given. At this level there is no distinction between a presented object and a presenting 
content. According to Blaustein, sensations are purely receptive acts. They are intrinsic presenta-
tions. All other presentations are based on them, and, in this sense, are derivative—they need sen-
sations. In all other presentations there is a distinction between an object and a presenting content.”
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or “improper” objects of presenting content; whereas by the “proper object” he un-
derstands the object of direct intuition which is directly founded on sensations, and 
by “improper object” is to be understood the object of indirect intuition which inter-
prets or apprehends sensations (Blaustein, 1931b, 20). With this in mind, Blaustein 
(1931a, 124–128; 2005, 24–27) distinguishes three forms of intuition: (1) perceptual 
or direct intuition where the presenting content is a function of “original sensory con-
tents,” and it characterizes the function as strictly intuitive; (2)  secondary intuition 
where sense-data can be either (a) reproduced (e.g., in the act of remembering), or 
(b) created (e.g., in the act of imagining, say, a Pegasus), and (3) imaginative intui-
tion. The last form of intuition is instantiated by imaginative presentations in which 
the presentational content is a function of “original sensory contents,” however, the 
presentation so-to-speak duplicates the object as both intuitively given in perception 
and imagined, i.e., the presentation has both proper and improper objects. Let me 
note that both secondary, and imaginative intuitions are indirect. Blaustein defines 
also two types of non-intuitive presentations, namely: (1) schematic presentations (if 
the function of representation is realized by inadequate signs, e.g., judgments; here 
“the schematized object” is represented by “the schematizing object,” e.g., a schematic 
presentation of Europe can be schematically represented by a map), and (2) symbol-
ic presentations (if the function of representation is realized by symbols which are 
founded of conventions, e.g., a skeleton symbolically presents death since a cultural 
convention binds these two elements) (Blaustein, 1931b, 7–9). Both schematic, and 
symbolic presentations are non-intuitive, i.e., abstract, and conceptual presentations.
As claimed, Blaustein refers to formulated descriptive differences, and he uses 
these classifications in his analysis of different aesthetic experiences. At bottom, he 
agrees with Ingarden that aesthetic experience has temporal structure, meaning it 
develops over time. Moreover, he is perfectly aware that, given the various kinds of 
works of art, there are different forms of intuition at play in the domain of aesthetic 
experiences (Blaustein, 1937, 400–401; 2005, 136–137). For him, the fact of the variety 
of different forms, or types of works of art is prima facie justified. In this regard he 
considers, e.g., static works of art, like a painting or a sculpture, where only perception 
and perceptual presentations can be at play. He notices, however, that given tempo-
ral nature of aesthetic experience, other presentations can go to the fore, e.g., addi-
tional schematic, or symbolic presentations can modify further experiences, if some-
one realizes that she or he comprehends objects as possessing a symbolic meaning. 
Blaustein makes an example in this context by referring to Husserl’s (1995, 251–252; 
1983, 261–262) famous discussion (from Ideas I) of Albrecht Dürer’s “Knight, Death 
and the Devil.” In Blaustein’s (1930b, 23–24, fn. 3; 2005, 54–55, fn. 20) view, Husserl 
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too hastily claims that the copperplate of Dürer represents, among others, death since 
the skeleton represents death only symbolically, and not directly; nonetheless, sym-
bolic presentation occurs on the basis (Blaustein speaks of “psychological foundation” 
in this regard) of perceptual and imaginative presentations. According to Blaustein, 
then, this particular experience goes as follows: (1) one directly experiences sense-da-
ta, which (2) are apprehended in perception as shapes; nonetheless, (3) one sees not 
the shapes, but through the shapes other objects, i.e., a skeleton, and this is possible 
because imaginative presentations produce the improper object of intention; finally, 
(4)  one realizes that the skeleton symbolically represents death, and this is possible 
because of symbolic presentations. All in all, aesthetic experience is constituted as a 
whole of all these moments, and its aim is to experience aesthetic pleasure (emotional 
component) which manifests itself in a polyphonic harmony of aesthetic qualities of 
different layers of the experienced object (Blaustein, 1930b, 47; 1938b, 53; 2005, 184). 
What distinguishes Blaustein’s (1936–1937; 1938b, 53–55; 2005, 184–186) view of aes-
thetic emotions from Ingarden’s position is the claim that the preliminary emotion 
is not necessary for the experience itself, and moreover, the work of art can found 
different—other than aesthetic—values, e.g., the educational value in an example of a 
movie. So, as we see, the structure of the aesthetic experience of perceiving a painting 
is for Blaustein indeed complex. 
Blaustein also uses his theory of imaginative presentations in regard to a theat-
er play, and, consequently, to watching a movie. Let me focus on the first example 
when Blaustein (1930b, 15; 2005, 48) considers Shaw’s Caesar and Cleopatra. What 
one directly, or perceptually experiences is something that is happening on stage dur-
ing the play. However, one sees not meaningless events, but, say, actors’ performances 
while Caesar talks with Cleopatra; here the different roles are constituted as quasi-real 
objects in the following way: the imagined object (e.g., Caesar) constituted in the 
imaginative presentation is given at once as intuitive (the real movements and words 
happening on the stage) and non-intuitive (Caesar meeting Cleopatra). Whereas the 
former is the proper object of perceptual intention, the latter is the improper object 
of the imaginative intention. The difference arises at the descriptive-psychological 
level: the intuitive object has properties “truly” ascribed to it by the act (e.g., being a 
man, or woman, having blond, or dark hair), and the non-intuitive object has prop-
erties ascribed in the modus “quasi.” From a phenomenological viewpoint, Blaustein 
compares this experience with illusion, however, what differentiates imaginative ex-
perience from illusionary experience is the lack of a belief that the object exist at all 
(in illusion, according to Blaustein, one has to believe that the illusion is true). Besides 
the perceptual and the imaginary object, there is also Caesar as a historical figure who 
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lived in ancient times. In this context, Blaustein differentiates between (1) the repro-
ducing object, (2) the imaginative object, and (3) the reproduced object. What is intui-
tively, or perceptually given, then, is only the reproducing object (events happening at 
the stage; object, or objects which have “truly” ascribed properties); this is the basis 
for a quasi-adequate presentation, i.e., the imaginative object, which is non-intuitively 
given (actor comprehended as Caesar; object, or objects which have quasi-ascribed 
properties); both, however, refer to the reproduced object, either the real, or the fic-
tional one (Caesar as a historical person, or, say a Pegasus; these objects can be situat-
ed “somewhere,” and “sometime” in the real, or fictional world). 
With this in mind, Blaustein (1938a, 14–15; 2005, 10–11) notices an important 
phenomenological difference: perceptual acts found imaginative acts, but inasmuch as 
presentational content in perceptual acts represent their reproducing objects adequately, 
in imaginative acts the contents cannot represent the imaginative object adequately. If 
one sees the actor who plays Caesar, the presenting content of this act refers adequately 
to the person as the person, but can we then say they represent the actor as Caesar either 
adequately or inadequately? As Blaustein puts it, presentational contents present the 
object in imaginative presentations only quasi-adequately. The difference is clear: the 
reproducing object is present in the same surrounding world as the viewer is, namely, in 
the theater; the imaginative object is present in the world inherent to the work of art, say, 
a Cleopatra’s Egypt; but the reproduced object is not real, but used to be real in the past. 
E. g., Caesar’s conversation with Cleopatra is performed on the stage not in the theater, 
but in the front of Sphinx in Egypt, just as Shaw writes about this in his play. To explain 
how imaginative objects are given, Blaustein (1930b, 23–24; 2005, 54–55) writes of qua-
si-real objects. For him, imaginative intuition is the act that creates quasi-real objects if 
the subject adopts the imaginative attitude. Blaustein (1938a, 13; 2005, 10) characterizes 
the object as given in a quasi-spatiality and a quasi-time (cf. Rosińska, 2001, 70–71). In 
other words, what a viewer is looking at is simultaneously the stage in the surrounding 
world and the quasi-world—which Blaustein also calls the imaginative world. While 
being directed towards the imaginative world, one “forgets” about the real world; this 
means for Blaustein: imaginative presentation, and the reference to the reproduced ob-
ject is possible because aesthetic experience does not contain the belief that the object of 
this presentation exists. In other words, aesthetic experience distances one from the real 
world, and enables one to “see” (only quasi-adequately) the non-real (imaginative, or 
fictional) world. If so, aesthetic experience distances one from her, or his “natural” life, 
it enables one to “take a rest” from everyday life (Blaustein, 1933, 46; 2005, 125). This, 
as stated above, is close to Ingarden’s approach for whom aesthetic experience distances 
one from the world of praxis. 
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4. CONCLUSION
Dziemidok (1980, 178) and, more recently, Ptaszek (2011, 120) claim that Blu-
astein’s aesthetics is inspired, or even influenced by Ingarden’s phenomenology. Given 
the historical context—discussed in section 1 of the present article—I take this gen-
eral hypothesis for granted. But, even if Blaustein is indeed influenced by Ingarden, 
the following questions arise: To what extent are both theories are interconnected?, and, 
more specifically: Which elements of Ingarden’s theory does Blaustein refer to, and how, 
if at all, does he reconsider this approach? By raising these questions, my aim here is to 
define specific elements which bind, and differ both approaches to aesthetics. To do 
this, I discussed at the beginning Ingarden’s phenomenology of aesthetic experience 
(section 2.1.), and its ontological background in the theory of intentional objects (sec-
tion 2.2.). Next, I considered Blaustein’s criticism of Ingarden’s method (section 3.1.). 
Finally, I reconstructed Blaustein’s theory of presentations, and I asked about its use 
in aesthetics (section 3.2.). The presented analysis, thus structured, allows me to con-
clude that, first, Blaustein takes over some particular aesthetic theses or insights of In-
garden; but, second, there are some elements of Ingarden’s aesthetics that are critically 
discussed, and redefined by Blaustein, and which mark clear breaks with his teacher’s 
theory. At the end, let me examine these points closer.
First of all, (1) Blaustein agrees with Ingarden that there is no general struc-
ture of aesthetic experience for all kinds of art; rather, the character, and structure of 
experience is strictly connected to the object that is perceived; in Blaustein’s terms, 
our experience combines different presentations dependent on what one perceives, 
e.g., schematic presentations if one reads a book, or imaginative presentations if one 
watches a movie. (2) Both Ingarden, and Blaustein (1938a, 8; 1938b, 26; 2005, 5–6, 
165) claim that the subject of aesthetic experience is active while constituting the aes-
thetic object. As a consequence of the description in point 2; (3) Blaustein (1937, 407; 
1938a, 7; 1938b, 42; 2005, 6, 144, 177) comprehends—just as Ingarden does—aesthet-
ic experience as a phasic structure, i.e., some phases of the experience are happening 
only if other phases are already passed21. Next, (4) Blaustein (1937, 403; 1938a, 18; 
2005, 13, 138) accepts Ingarden’s view of the work of art as a multi-layered object, and 
(5) he uses Ingarden’s theory of the spots of indeterminacy to describe aesthetic expe-
rience in general (Blaustein, 1938a, 23–24; 2005, 16), and, for instance, the experience 
of listening to the radio in particular (he considers, e.g., how one does understand the 
radio broadcast if not all required data are present [Blaustein, 1938b, 14; 2005, 155]). 
(6) Blaustein (1937, 402; 2005, 139) follows Ingarden in claiming that the aim of aes-
21 Here Blaustein refers to the Husserlian-Ingardenian idea of the living memory.
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thetic experience is to constitute a “polyphony,” or an organized whole of aesthetic 
value qualities (on different levels, or layers of the work of art), and (7) he compre-
hends—just as Ingarden (1961, 307–308; 1973a, 207) does—aesthetic experience as 
directed toward Gestalt qualities. Finally, (8) they both hold that aesthetic experience 
situates one outside the everyday life, or the world of praxis. 
As claimed, however, there are also elements that are critically reconsidered or 
redefined by Blaustein. (9) Even if he follows Ingarden to emphasize the dominant 
role of feelings (in relation to the intellectual attitude) in the experience of watching 
a movie (Blaustein, 1933, 26; 2005, 109), he claims—contra Ingarden—that there are 
also non-aesthetic feelings, and values, e.g., the value of education, involved in the 
experience (Blaustein, 1933, 34–35; 2005, 116–117)22. (10) Blaustein (1938b, 53; 2005, 
184)  agrees with Ingarden that the preliminary emotion is an element of aesthetic 
experience, but (different than Ingarden) he claims that the emotion is preceded by 
an anticipation of the emotion, i.e., by the act of perception of the object. (11) For this 
reason, while Ingarden insists that perception is unnecessary for aesthetic experience, 
Blaustein holds that there is no aesthetic experience without perception. Additionally, 
(12)  Blaustein speaks of Ingarden’s idea of quasi -judgements which enables one to 
refer to the object presented in the work of art; for him, the belief moment lacks in 
these judgements (Blaustein, 1933, 23; 2005, 107), and to explain this—different than 
Ingarden (1973b, 176–177)—he identifies quasi-judgements with Meinong’s assump-
tions (Blaustein, 1937, 402; 2005, 139). If this is the case, however, Blaustein misreads 
Ingarden in this regard. 
I think that Blaustein’s criticism of and break with Ingarden’s aesthetics is 
marked by his critical assessment of the eidetic method. As claimed in the section 
3.1., Blaustein offers to understand phenomenology as descriptive psychology, rather 
than as an eidetic discipline. This important shift in methodology has far reaching 
consequences for the Ingarden-Blaustein discussion: (13)  whereas Ingarden’s aes-
thetics is developed mainly as phenomenology, and ontology of aesthetic experience, 
Blaustein’s approach seems to go beyond ontology towards descriptive-psychological 
analysis; in result, (14) whereas Ingarden speaks of lived experiences, Blaustein pre-
fers presentations, and its complexes, or combinations. (15) Thus, although they both 
refer also to the notion of “constitution” to describe aesthetic experience in its relation 
to the aesthetic object, they understand it differently: for Ingarden, constitution is a 
“creation” of a purely intentional object; for Blaustein, in turn, constitution means a 
22 More on Ingarden’s post-war theory of a movie, also in relation to Blaustein, writes Rosińska (2001, 
90–91).
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“combination” of different presentations. (16) All in all, Blaustein’s central reconsid-
eration, if it is not a misreading of Ingarden’s aesthetics, lies in a different attitude, 
namely, to reinterpret the Ingardenian idea of pure and also intentional objects in a 
descriptive-psychological fashion, i.e., to describe these objects from a phenomeno-
logical viewpoint, or, in other words, to describe how one does experience these ob-
jects. In contrast to Ingarden, then, for Blaustein phenomenology determines ontology. 
In consequence, even if Blaustein (1937, 401; 2005, 138) adapts Ingarden’s (1973b, 
317–323) vocabulary of representing, and represented objects, and he gives some 
clues to interpret the imagined object given in the imaginative intuition—as defined 
in section 3.2.—as a purely intentional object which hides, or conceals its true, i.e., 
purely intentional nature, Blaustein obscures Ingarden’s clear relation between three 
objects: an also intentional object, a purely intentional object, and the real object (cf. 
Dziemidok, 1980, 34–35). By employing the theory of representations, namely, he 
reduces the real object to the complex of sensations which are absolutely adequate; 
but if sensations are indeed the basis for aesthetic experience, as Blaustein holds, the 
aesthetic object loses its purely intentional status in favor of the real status. So, para-
doxically, Blaustein’s attempt to go beyond Ingarden’s ontology, and to reconsider his 
aesthetics, is only partial since it misreads, to some extent, the theory of intentional 
objects.
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